Individual Consular Rights: Foreign Law and Practice
Overview
In a recent brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States
reasserted its current litigating position that Article 36 of the
Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)
“does
not confer individually enforceable rights” and that “the
implementation of Article 36...abroad belies an individual-rights
interpretation.”[1]
In reality, more than 60 parties to the treaty
recognize
that article 36 of the VCCR confers
specific legal
rights on individual foreign detainees; many countries require
advisement of
those individual rights simultaneously with other legal safeguards such
as the
right to an attorney. Official sources (including the United
States’ own submissions to the International Court of Justice) confirm
that the implementation of individual consular rights under Article 36
is both
long-established and widespread. Furthermore, courts in other
countries,
including those with common-law judicial systems similar to the United
States,
have recognized that judicial remedies are available for violations of
individual consular rights. Finally, no party to the VCCR
has formally supported the U.S. interpretation of the treaty or filed
any reservations
to its ratification of the treaty that support the U.S. interpretation
of
Article 36 rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that,
when
construing a multilateral treaty, the interpretations of its terms by
other
treaty parties must be accorded “considerable weight.” Air
France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 404 (1985); see also
Olympic
Airlines v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We can,
and should, look to
decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions.
Foreign
constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the
contracting parties.”).
In addition, the U.S. position squarely contradicts the binding determination of the International Court of Justice in LaGrand and Avena, holdings that the Supreme Court had previously recognized should be given “respectful consideration” as “the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such”. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
Legal Positions of 60 Foreign Governments
Before the
U.S. Supreme Court
The most obvious indicators of international disagreement with the U.S.
position are the legal submissions made to the U.S. Supreme Court by 60
nations
that are parties to the VCCR. In
2004, the
Member States of the Council of Europe (comprising 45 nations) joined
in an amicus
curiae brief to the Court in the case of Medellin
v. Dretke, stating their position that
“Article 36 confers legally-enforceable rights” on individuals and
that “judicial review of conviction and sentence is required if Article
36 is violated.” [2] In
that
same case, 13 Latin American nations submitted a brief arguing that the
United
States must comply fully with the ICJ finding of
individually-enforceable
rights under Article 36 and that U.S. authorities must “furnish a legal
remedy” for its violation. [3]
Canada
and Mexico have taken the same position in their own briefs to the
Court. [4] Notably, no
party to the VCCR has submitted a brief to
the Court in support of the
U.S. position to the contrary.
Foreign court decisions recognizing individual Article 36 rights and remedies
Germany
A recent unanimous decision by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that German courts must follow the ICJ findings in LaGrand and Avena that Article 36 confers individual and judicially-enforceable rights on foreign detainees. Within the ICJ's sphere of competence, its compulsory judgments are found by the Court to be persuasive even in cases where Germany was not a party. Article 36 itself has been confirmed to be directly applicable in the domestic legal order as treaty law on par with a federal law (Article 59, para. 2 of the German Basic Law). The decision sends the underlying criminal appeals back to the federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) because its former rulings on the claim did not show the required respect for the ICJ judgments. The Constitutional Court did not decide whether the convictions in question were based on the violation of Article 36 rights, which would be for the ordinary criminal courts to determine. Notably, the constitutional violation found by the Court is the right to a fair trial.
The Constitutional Court decision thus directly conflicts with the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006)(finding that the ICJ interpretation of Article 36 rights is not binding on the domestic courts). Significantly, the Constitutional Court cites Sanchez-Llamas and then reaches the opposite conclusion. To the extent that Sanchez-Llamas rests “[i]n particular” on the assumption that “there is little indication that other parties to the Convention have interpreted Article 36 to require a judicial remedy in the context of criminal prosecutions” and on "the contemporary practice of other signatories", see id. at 2680 and 2685, its findings are now factually inaccurate.
The informal case citation is: BVerfG, 2 BvR 2115/01 vom 19.9.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 77); the full opinion in German is posted at:
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20060919_2bvr211501.html
The decision is also discussed in the American
Journal of International
Law, Vol. 101 No. 3 (July 2007), at pp. 627-35.
State practice, according to the State
Department’s submissions to the ICJ
According to the State Department’s own submissions to the ICJ in the Avena
case [5], a number of other
Western
democracies:
--suspend interrogations pending consular
notification, or
--advise foreign detainees of their consular
rights upon
detention, simultaneously with their other legal rights and prior to
questioning.
“In Australia and New Zealand, our
Embassies report, law enforcement officials in practice stop
interrogation if
the individual asks for legal representation or to consult with the
consulate.”
A U.S. citizen detained in Denmark “will be informed of his rights to remain silent and to contact his consulate; if the detainee at this point does not wish the interrogation to continue it will be stopped until consular notification is provided.”
In Mexico “once Mexican law enforcement
officers are aware that a detainee is a U.S. national, they often
inform the
detainee of his or her rights...law enforcement officials in the
Tijuana and
Nogales consular districts apparently will usually stop interrogations
when a
request for consular notification is made”.
In the United Kingdom, notification of the consulate “is given
within a few hours”; courts in the UK have “excluded incriminating
statements made by foreign nationals from use at trial” where consular
information rights were not observed.
In other democracies, foreign detainees are “routinely informed” of
their consular rights prior to questioning:
“Our posts in Iceland, Ireland and
Kenya
report that...U.S. citizen detainees are routinely informed [of
consular
rights] in practice prior to being interrogated.”
In South Korea, “before interrogation, the
suspect signs a written statement if he or she does not want the
consulate to
be contacted.”
In Turkey, a “form provided upon detention
tells the detainee he or she may contact a relative or ‘a person [the
detainee has] established’ and the relative or the
‘Embassy/Consulate’ will be urgently informed.”
In Spain, a “Notice of rights form is
provided
at time of detention which includes the right of a foreign detainee to
inform
his or her consular officer or embassy of the detention.” Spanish
officials “typically notify United States consular officers upon the
detention of a U.S. citizen, even before the U.S. citizen is advised of
his or
her consular notification rights.”
In Brazil, “consular notification is
considered
one of the ‘rights’ under Article 5, LXIII
of the Brazilian Constitution, which provides that: ‘the arrested
person
will be informed of her rights, among them, the right to remain silent,
the
right to have legal and familiar assistance...”.
Other state practice sources
According to their official compliance reports submitted to the UN
Committee
Against Torture, [6] other
countries also
provide an advisement of consular rights upon detention and
simultaneously with
other legal rights.
For example, Latvia reported that: “Every foreigner who has been detained, including persons detained on the State border for more than three hours, is given the opportunity to contact the embassy of his/her country by telephone.” Estonia stated that “Upon detention the person will be informed of the right to contact consular representation.”
In Bahrain, “if the arrested person is a
foreigner, he has the right to communicate with his country’s embassy
or
embassy representative at the time of his arrest.... [and] the right
not to
talk about the charge without a lawyer being present....These rights
are spelt
out in the arrest form ”.
In Switzerland and Guatemala,
detainees are
provided with forms advising them of their right to counsel and their
right to
consular notification.
The criminal procedure codes of Poland, Indonesia,
Ecuador,
Australia, the UK and Lithuania require advising foreign detainees of their
consular
rights simultaneously with other legal rights.
Foreign statutes implementing individual
consular
rights prior to interrogation
Few nations outside of the USA recognize the doctrine of
“self-executing
treaties” (i.e., the American legal concept that designated treaties
gain
the force of law without implementing legislation). Where a ratified
treaty
requires amendments to domestic law or practice, those provisions are
typically
incorporated into the domestic law of other nations through separate
enabling legislation.
It is the statute implementing the treaty rather than the treaty proper
that
courts in those countries would normally look to when determining if
individual
rights and remedies are at stake.
Some domestic courts have misunderstood this crucial distinction and
have made much of the incidental fact that the courts of most VCCR
parties could not entertain a claim based directly on the
treaty itself, as evidence that the VCCR is not interprted by its other
parties as conferring individual rights. Far more relevant to this
determination is the fact that other nations sharing the U.S. common
law tradition (but not the self-executing treaty doctrine) have adopted
implementing statutes expressly based on their understanding of Article
36 requirements. The courts of those nations have then recognized and
remedied violations of the individual legal rights conferred by the
treaty, as given effect by the implementing statutes.
Australia
Australian law requires advisement of consular rights prior to
interrogation
and affords a reasonable time for the consulate to respond to
notification
before questioning can begin. Federal law (the Crimes Act (1914),
section
23P) and the laws of three states (New South Wales, Queensland and
Victoria)
all require police to provide foreign nationals with “reasonable
facilities” to communicate with their consulate and to defer
questioning
for a reasonable time until contact has taken place.
These provisions are based expressly on
Australia’s
understanding of Article 36 requirements. Australian codification of
the right
to consular information and notification “derives from Article 36 of
the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”, according to the Gibbs
Committee
Review of Australian Criminal Law report of 1991. The findings of the
Gibbs
Committee are the basis for the incorporation of all legal cautions
into
Australian arrest procedures.
United Kingdom
British law requires
advisement of
consular rights simultaneously with other legal rights and prior to
interrogation. Section 3, Code of Practice C, Police and Criminal
Evidence Act
(1984) requires that all detainees be informed of the right to consult
with an
attorney and cautioned about the right to remain silent before any
questioning
and, if they are a foreign national, be advised of their consular
communication
rights.
These requirements clearly reflect the United Kingdom’s understanding of its Article 36 obligations. Closely paralleling the language of the VCCR, Paragraph 7.1 of Code of Practice C requires that the detainee “must be informed as soon as practicable of their right to consular communication” and “their right, upon request, to have their...Consulate told of their whereabouts and the grounds for their detention.” Paragraph 7.3 of the Code states that “Consular officers may visit one of their nationals in police detention to talk to them and, if required, to arrange for legal advice.” These requirements are based on "the provisions of consular conventions" and a "record shall be made when a detainee is informed of their rights under this section." Id. paras 7.4, 7.5. Finally, in keeping with the Article 36(2) requirement that local laws and regulations must give “full effect” to these rights, the Notes for Guidance for these instructions state that: “The exercise of the rights in this section may not be interfered with,” even if the circumstances of the case fall within a legal exception that allows the authorities to delay the detainee’s right of access to an attorney.
Ireland
Irish law requires that detained foreign nationals be advised without
delay of
their right to consular notification and contact, simultaneously with
other
safeguards such as the right of access to an attorney prior to
questioning.
See Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Treatment Of Persons In
Custody In
Garda Síochána Stations)
Regulations 1987 – Regulation 14. [7]
The language of the advisement is identical to the provisions of
Article
36.
Responding to a European Union questionnaire on
legal rights
provisions, the Irish government noted:
“...certain information which must be given to suspects is set out either in legislation or in the custody regulations which govern the treatment of persons in Garda custody. This information is in fact given to suspects in the Garda station in written form by means of a form known as the C72 which sets out the rights of the detained person such as access to a solicitor, to medical advice, to consular assistance, to visits and to give notification of the person’s detention to a person named by them....One would expect a suspect to be informed of his or her rights when they first become at risk. Relevant information should be given to the person at least when the person is in custody.” [8]
New Zealand
The police advisement of rights to persons in custody required for
consistency
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA)
reads in part:
“NOTICE TO PERSON IN CUSTODY
As an accused person you are entitled to communicate without delay with, and be visited by, a solicitor of your choice.
If you are an accused person on overnight arrest you are also entitled
to
communicate with and be visited by your family or a friend; if no
family is
available, a medical practitioner, minister of religion, and if
you
are an alien, by your diplomatic or consular representative.”
Appended in Minister of Immigration & Anor
v Udompun [2005] NZCA
128 (26
May 2005) (emphasis added). See also id. at 13 (citing
testimony that
“embassies are normally available for assistance for their [detained]
citizens 24 hours a day seven days a week”).
France
Responding
to a
European Union questionnaire on legal rights provisions, the
Documentation and
Research Division of the French Court of Cassation noted that:
“The
need for
states to protect the universally recognized fundamental rights with
regard to
migrants, by
providing
them with
particular assistance and protection in order to guarantee them the
rights
established in the Vienna Convention, in particular the right to be
informed of
the consular assistance available from their country of origin, has
been evoked
by the United Nations General Assembly. . . . Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention establishes a genuine human right, in that a person, as
proven by
the ICJ in the LaGrand case, is not simply
the
subject of consular protection, but takes part in it as a subject of
law, in
that he can refuse that protection.”
A series
of
circulars from the French Ministry of Justice give domestic effect to
these
rights by placing a “general obligation on the head of the penal
establishment to inform the foreign detainee, as soon as he is
detained, of the
possibility of informing his consul that he has been imprisoned, to ask
for a
visit from him and to correspond with him.” In the absence of a
bilateral treaty requiring other methods, notification of the consulate
is
“subject to the authorization of the accused person according to the
Vienna Convention”. [8A]
South Korea
Under Article 6 of the Constitution of South Korea, treaties “duly concluded and promulgated. . . have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea” and the “status of foreigners is guaranteed as prescribed by international law and treaties.” Guidelines for the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea (BOP KOMI No. 01129-299), entitled “Directives for the Investigation of Crimes Committed by Foreigners” (30 April 1993), stipulate the following:
"(a) When investigative agencies arrest or detain a foreigner, they shall immediately inform him that he is entitled to freely interview and communicate with consular or honorary consular officers of his home State stationed in the Republic of Korea, and that at his request, the consular officers or the honorary consular officers shall be immediately notified of his arrest or detention;
(b) In addition, if the person arrested or detained so requests, the investigative agencies shall send a communiqué containing the detainee's personal data and the particulars of his case, including his commission of a crime, the date and location of his arrest or detention, his current location, etc. to the head of honorary head of the consular post."
As the State Department recognized in its submission to the ICJ regarding State practice, the intent of these guidelines is to ensure that foreign detainees are advised of their consular rights and sign a form indicating their wishes as to consular notification before any custodial interrogation takes place.
Foreign court decisions requiring individual
remedies
Courts in
Australia and the United Kingdom have construed the implementing
language
discussed above as requiring the suppression of statements or exclusion
of
evidence where their terms were not complied with and there was a
minimal
showing that the breach was prejudicial to the defendant. Neither
country’s implementing statute requires a judicial remedy; courts have
instead fashioned appropriate remedies from their common-law authority
to
exclude evidence in the interests of justice.
The United States’ argument that these lower court rulings should be given no precedential weight is very doubtful. First, no court in either country has construed these statutory obligations to the contrary in any case. [9] Second, in no case did the prosecution appeal the ruling granting suppression on these grounds, indicating that there is no legal dispute over the correctness of these holdings. Third, authoritative legal texts in both countries affirm the binding legal obligation to advise foreign detainees of these individual treaty rights. [10] Finally, there are no essential factual or legal distinctions between these cases and those of foreign nationals arrested and prosecuted in the United States.
The analytical approach adopted by the courts in both countries is consistent with the requirements for addressing U.S. consular rights violations outlined by the International Court of Justice. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 128 (March 31, 2004), at para. 127 (the question of the exclusion of evidence for a violation of the defendant's consular rights “is one which has to be examined under the concrete circumstances of each case by the United States courts.”).
Australia
Courts in Australia have applied suppression in cases where police did
not
comply with consular rights obligations, also holding that this breach
of legal
rights alone is sufficient to warrant exclusionary remedies:
See Tan Seng Kiah v R [2000] 10 NTLR 128 (Northern Territories Court of Criminal Appeals) (suppressing statement where, inter alia, consulate was not notified at the detainee’s request). Reviewing the factual record, the Court noted:
“The right to communicate with or to attempt to
communicate with the consular office is contained in s 23P of the
Crimes Act.
There is an obligation imposed upon the investigating official to give
the
person arrested reasonable facilities to communicate with the consular
office.
In this case nothing was done.”
The court found that the police took no steps to
contact the
consulate, made only desultory efforts to secure counsel and sought no
extension of time for the custodial investigation period:
“Had the investigating authorities undertaken any
one of those steps the applicant is likely to have obtained advice
and it
may well have been the case that the applicant would have declined to
be
interviewed or the interview and the resulting record would have
assumed a
different form.”
See also Foo v The
Queen [2001]
NTCCA 2 (finding no violation of Section
23P and
therefore no grounds to suppress the statement). Although the court
here found
no violation of consular rights, it reaffirmed the prior holding in Tan
Seng Kiah
that breaches of
Section 23P standing alone are subject to suppression or exclusion.
Australian courts have also recognized that the advisement of consular rights must occur prior to custodial interrogation of a known non-citizen, or suppression may be required.
See R. v. Tan [2001] WASC 275 (5 October 2001) (Supreme Court of Western Australia):
In this drug smuggling case, the Court excluded evidence obtained by the Australian Federal Police during a search of the suspect’s room, for failure to advise the foreign national of his statutory rights (including the right to consular communication prior to any questioning taking place). In determining that the violations of rights were so prejudicial as to require exclusion of evidence, the Court noted (at 58) that:
“The evidence establishes that the AFP conduct involved a deliberate disregard of the applicant's statutory rights. This involved relevant unfairness to the applicant. The following extract from R v Su [1997] 1 VR 1 (at 55) captures the applicant's situation:
‘Stripped to its essentials, the case is one in
which
a foreign national, who, so far as the evidence went, had no
familiarity at all
with Australian police procedures, and whom the interviewing police
officer
believed had committed a very serious offence, was interviewed without
being
given a proper caution and without being informed of his rights. We
consider
that to tender that statement against him is unfair.’”
See also R v Su [1997] 1 VR
1 (Supreme Court of Victoria), at 114:
After suppressing the
foreign
defendant’s first statement for failure to advise him of any of his
legal
rights, the court observed that the defendant was cautioned and
informed of his
rights prior to the second interview, also noting that: “Before the
police began this [second] interview they permitted [the defendant] to
see a
Japanese consular official. Thus no question of any contravention of
s23P of
the Crimes Act arises.” In context, it is clear that the
reviewing
court was prepared to suppress the second custodial statement on
section 23P
grounds if the consular notification requirement had not been met.
Australian courts have further held that access to consular contact
prior to
interrogation is an essential right, for which the provision of access
to
counsel or an interpreter is no substitute:
“Contacting the consular office by a detained
foreign
national provides an opportunity to. . . seek advice and assistance. .
. One
need only contemplate the predicament of an Australian national held in
custody
in a foreign non-English speaking country without access to an
Australian
consular office to appreciate the importance of the right . . . .The
right to
consult a legal practitioner or. . . the right to contact the consular
office.
. .are rights independent of the right of access to an interpreter.
They are
rights available to be enjoyed ‘as soon as practicable’.”
Tan Seng Kiah, [2002] NTCCA
1 at 49, 51.
A request for consular notification must be acted on immediately; even if the detainee subsequently withdraws that request, the breach of consular notification requirements must still be addressed by the courts:
“For a period of approximately 24 hours the request existed and was not acted upon. A statutory obligation was imposed upon the police and they failed to comply with that obligation. The fact that the applicant subsequently withdrew his request does not diminish the seriousness of the failure during the period the request was extant. In those circumstances there was a breach of the requirements of the Crimes Act. . . . it is clear that when a person is arrested and not dealt with in accordance with the law, the subsequent detention is unlawful and statements or admissions of the arrested person may be excluded in the exercise of a discretion.”
Id. at 53-55.
United Kingdom
Courts in the United Kingdom have granted suppression on these grounds
alone,
even when the detainees were advised of and waived their right to
counsel.
Notably, the British implementing statute (para.
7.4
of PACE Code of Conduct C) does not state a time frame in which
notification
must take place, expressly require that interrogations be suspended
pending
consular notification, or specify a remedy for its violation.
R. v. Bassil and Mouffareg (1990) 28 July, Acton Crown
Court, HHJ Sich
(reported in Legal
Action, December 1990, at page 21):
“Each [defendant] signed the custody record to
indicate that they did not require a solicitor. Both defendants were
interviewed at length in the absence of a solicitor and made
substantial
admissions. However, there was a lingering doubt about whether the
defendants had
understood their rights, in particular the right of silence and the
right to an
independent solicitor. If para. 7.4 had
been complied
with, a French or Arabic speaking official would have visited the
defendants in
the police station at short notice. Such a person would have helped
them to
reach an informed decision about their position, and might well have
advised
them to obtain the services of a solicitor and an interpreter before
being
interviewed. It followed that the breach of para.7.4 was substantial
and
significant and so the evidence of the interview should be excluded.”
R. v. Van Axel and Wezer
(1991) 31 May, Snaresbrook Crown Court, HHJ
Sich (reported in Legal Action,
September 1991, at
page 12):
“[The trial judge] said that the situation could
vary
enormously, from foreign nationals who had been resident in the UK for
many
years, to those who spoke no English and were here for the first time,
but in
all cases ‘compliance was extremely important’....[The judge] had
some disquiet about whether they understood their rights, both because
Ms Van
Axel had asked what a solicitor was and because they had been given
out-of-date
rights in Dutch. He held that it was at least possible that, if
contact
with the embassy had been made, the defendants would have been advised
to ask
for a solicitor who spoke Dutch.”
Canada
The Federal Court of Canada recently recognized that Article 36 confers
individual legal rights on Canadian nationals that they may rely on in
domestic
judicial proceedings:
“Statutes should be construed to comply with
Canada’s
international obligations....Specifically, the International Court of
Justice's
decision in LaGrand...states that the VCCR does create individual rights to the
services requested
by the Applicants in this case.”
Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Foreign
Affairs),
2004 FC 1145, at paras. 26, 27.
Non-objections to Article 36 by ratifying
States
Under international law, a ratifying nation may attach limiting declarations or reservations to specific treaty provisions unless the reservation “is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.” [11] According to the United Nations Treaty Collection, some of the169 parties to the VCCR have attached reservations to various provisions of the treaty. However, no party to the treaty has attached any reservations to Article 36 that would limit the scope or effect of its language conferring rights on individual detainees. [12] More significantly still, this uniform pattern of non-objection has continued after the ICJ decisions in LaGrand and Avena holding that Article 36 confers specific rights on individuals, violations of which are subject to domestic legal remedies. Ratifications of the VCCR postdating the ICJ decision in Avena (Cambodia, Monaco and Singapore) have attached no reservations to full acceptance of Article 36.
Subsequent treaties regarding consular notification procedures
In the three decades since the adoption of
the VCCR in 1963, at least ten
multilateral treaties have been
approved that contain provisions requiring consular notification in the
cases
of foreign detainees. Each without exception enshrines the
individual right
of those detainees to consular information and communication, often
incorporating the language of VCCR Article
36
verbatim. For example, article 16 of the UN Convention on
the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of
Their Families
(1990) states:
7. When a migrant worker or a member of his or her family is arrested
or
committed to prison or custody pending trial or is detained in any
other
manner:
(a) The consular or diplomatic authorities of his or her State of origin or of a State representing the interests of that State shall, if he or she so requests, be informed without delay of his or her arrest or detention and of the reasons therefor;
(b) The person concerned shall have the right to communicate with the said authorities. Any communication by the person concerned to the said authorities shall be forwarded without delay, and he or she shall also have the right to receive communications sent by the said authorities without delay;
(c) The person concerned shall be informed without delay of this right and of rights deriving from relevant treaties, if any, applicable between the States concerned, to correspond and to meet with representatives of the said authorities and to make arrangements with them for his or her legal representation.
If there was any serious objection within the international community
to an
understanding that Article 36 was intended to confer private and
enforceable
rights on individuals, it is virtually certain that these subsequent
treaties
would not contain identical and unqualified rights-conferring language.
Conclusion
The
weight
of international authority from numerous independent sources thus
clearly
supports the recent findings of many domestic courts that Article
36
confers rights on individual foreign nationals. [13] Those findings are consistent with two
centuries of
Supreme Court jurisprudence affirming that rights conferred under
self-executing treaties will be enforced by the domestic courts, and
that any
ambiguity in the treaty provision must be construed so as to give full
effect
to individual rights. [14]
While the executive’s interpretation of a treaty
is
accorded “much weight,” it is “not conclusive upon a court
called upon to construe such a treaty in a matter involving personal
rights.” Charlton v. Kelly, 229
ENDNOTES
[1] See Brief for the United States Supporting Respondents, Bustillo v. Johnson and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (Nos. 05-51 and 04-1056) (January 2006), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/USBustilloAmicusfinal.pdf
[2] Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (Oct. 20, 2004), available at
[3] Brief of Foreign Sovereigns as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (Oct. 20, 2004), available at
[4] See Brief Amicus
Curiae of the
United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner, Medellin
v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct.
2088 (Oct. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/dpny-21879786-v1-Mexico%20Amicus%20Brief.PDF
See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Canada in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Faulder v. Johnson (No. 98-7001) (November 25, 1998) (arguing that Article 36 confers individual legal rights and that application of state rules of procedural default to an individual claim conflicts with the “full effect” requirement of Article 36(2)).
[5] Annex 4 to the U.S. Counter-Memorial (Declaration of Ambassador Maura A. Harty Concerning State Practice in Implementing Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). Available at:
[6] State
parties to CAT
are required to submit periodic reports on their compliance with its
provisions, including the obligation under article 6(3) that a
foreigner facing
torture charges shall be “assisted in communicating immediately with
the
nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a
national.” The State Party Reports submitted to the Committee are
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf
[7] The full text of the Irish legal advisement is available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZSI119Y1987.html#ZZSI119Y1987A8
[8] See Question 28, Green Paper on procedural safeguards for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union: Response of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/criminal/procedural/responses/28.pdf
[8A] Full document available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/criminal/procedural/responses/cour_de_cassation_tra_en.pdf
[9] The United States’
citation of an earlier Australian case as indicating that Article 36
does not
confer individual rights is incorrect. R. v. Abbrederis
predates the amendments to the Crimes Act implementing Article 36
rights, and
involved routine questioning by customs agents of an individual
entering
Australia—not the interrogation of a criminal suspect already in
custody.
A thorough search of Australian case law (March 21, 2006) by the author
via
Lexis discovered no cases construing the Australian implementing
statutes other
than as indicated.
[10] See, e.g., Halsbury's Laws of Australia, at [80-1020], n. 4 (“A person under arrest who is not an Australian citizen has rights to communicate with the relevant consular office”); Halsbury’s Laws of England, sec. 728 (detained foreign national “must be informed as soon as practicable of his right to communicate with his consul if he so wishes. He must also be informed that the police will notify his consul of his arrest if he wishes.”). See also Carter’s Criminal Law of Queensland, Part V, Division 1, Questioning Relevant Persons About Indictable Offences, at 40(3) (requiring police officers to advise detained foreign nationals that: “Before I ask you any questions I must tell you that you have the right to telephone, or attempt to telephone, the embassy or consular office of the country of which you are a citizen. Do you want to telephone your embassy or consular office?”).
[11] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), art. 19 (c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
[12] In fact, only one VCCR party has attached any form of reservation to Article 36, and it applies only to the visitation rights conferred on consular officers. Qatar has declared that “The rights accorded in this article shall not extend to those consular employees who are engaged in administrative tasks or to the members of their families.” In other words, only an accredited consular officer may exercise the right to consular contact and visits.
[13] See, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 382 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rangel‑Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1980); Hernandez v. U.S., 280 F.Supp.2d 118, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002); People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. App. 2002); Madej v. Schomig, No. 98-C-1866, 2002 WL 31386480, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2002); Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); U.S. v. Superville, 40 F.Supp.2d 672, 678 (D.V. I. 1999); United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (S.D. Cal. 1999); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. Ill. 1999); U.S. v. Briscoe, 69 F.Supp.2d 738, 747 (D.V.I. 1999); United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F.Supp.2d 931, 932-33 (C.D.Ill.1999); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F.Supp.2d 74, 77-78 (D.Mass.1999); U.S. v. Rodrigues, 68 F.Supp.2d 178, 183 (E.D.N.Y.1999); United States v. $69,530.00 in United States Currency, 22 F.Supp.2d 593, 594 (W.D.Tex.1998); Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla.Crim.App.2005); State v. Miranda, 622 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. App. 2001); State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (Del. 1999); see also Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088, 2103-2104 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, C.J., concurring in part; dissenting in part); People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 431 (Ill. 2000) (McMorrow J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[14] See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (1796); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806); Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809)(Marshall, C.J.); Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813); Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 249 (1830); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832); Perchemann v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1879); Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); DeGeoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Jones v. Meahan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 320-22 (1907); Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 449 (1924); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (1924); Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336 (1925); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1936); Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989). See also Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 n.13, 186 n.14 (1982) (listing examples of treaties protecting foreign citizens’ rights beginning with 1778 treaty between United States and France); The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. 152, 168 (1821) (“The long and universal usage of the Courts of the United States has sanctioned the exercise of this right” of consular assistance).
[15] See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 181, 194-199 (1901); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 319-321 (1907); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924); Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336 (1925); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328, 337-342 (1939); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (observing that the Court was rejecting a view of the Warsaw Convention that had consistently been adopted by the Executive Branch and had been pressed by the United States in that case); see also The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. 152 (1821) (disagreeing with government and recognizing standing of consuls to assist and represent interests of nationals); United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 594-596 (1841) (rejecting executive interpretation that individuals abducted into slavery constitute recoverable property falling within the scope of a treaty provision).